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Abstract Over the past several decades, we have argued
that cultural evolution can facilitate the evolution of large-
scale cooperation because it often leads to more rapid
adaptation than genetic evolution, and, when multiple
stable equilibria exist, rapid adaptation leads to variation
among groups. Recently, Lehmann, Feldman, and col-
leagues have published several papers questioning this
argument. They analyze models showing that cultural
evolution can actually reduce the range of conditions under
which cooperation can evolve and interpret these models as
indicating that we were wrong to conclude that culture
facilitated the evolution of human cooperation. In the main,
their models assume that rates of cultural adaption are not
strong enough compared to migration to maintain persistent
variation among groups when payoffs create multiple stable
equilibria. We show that Lehmann et al. reach different
conclusions because they have made different assumptions.
We argue that the assumptions that underlie our models are
more consistent with the empirical data on large-scale
cultural variation in humans than those of Lehmann et al.,
and thus, our models provide a more plausible account of
the cultural evolution of human cooperation in large
groups.
Keywords Cooperation.Altruism.Culture
…although a high standard of morality gives but a
slight or no advantage to each individual man and his
children over the other men of the same tribe, yet that
an increase in the number of well-endowed men and
an advancement in the standard of morality will
certainly give an immense advantage to one tribe over
another. A tribe including many members who, from
possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism,
fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were
always ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice
themselves for the common good, would be victori-
ous over most other tribes; and this would be natural
selection.
Charles Darwin (1874), Descent of Man, p. 132
Most contemporary human societies are larger and more
cooperative than those of other mammals. In most mammal
species, cooperation is limited to small groups; there is little
division of labor, no trade, no large-scale conflict, no social
support for sick or disabled, and no moral systems enforced
by third parties (Clutton-Brock 2009). In stark contrast,
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DOI 10.1007/s00265-010-1100-3even in simple foraging societies people cooperate in large
groups (e.g., Hill 2002). Division of labor, trade, and
intergroup conflict are important nearly everywhere (Ridley
2010; Bowles 2009). The sick and disabled are often cared
for, and social life is regulated by moral systems usually
shared by thousands of individuals enforced, albeit imper-
fectly, by third party sanctions (Boehm 1999).
In chapter 5 of the Descent of Man, Darwin argued that
the distinctive features of human sociality resulted from
selection among groups with different standards of
morality—conforming to the local moral system does not
lead to individual disadvantage, but tribes with more
effective moral systems would replace those with less
effective systems. What Darwin did not seem to realize, but
theoretical developments over the last 40 years or so have
made clear, is that this kind of process can be effective only
if something maintains sufficient heritable variation among
groups (or equivalently, maintains sufficient relatedness
within groups). In most animal species, heritable genetic
variation among groups results from limited migration and
small group size, and it seems unlikely that these processes
can generate sufficient variation among large groups in
mammal species with small families and substantial
migration between groups.
In a series of publications, we have argued that cultural
evolution leads to much variation among very large human
groups and that this fact may explain our distinctive
sociality. This hypothesis rests on three assumptions:
1. Mechanisms of reciprocity, reputation, signaling, and
punishment can stabilize a vast range of heritable
behaviors ranging from ruthless spite to prosocial
cooperation (Henrich 2006). Adaptive learning biases
in human cognition, including conformist learning, can
both re-enforce these effects, and in some circum-
stances, stabilize many equilibria in the absence of
reputational mechanisms (Boyd and Richerson 1985;
Henrich and Boyd 2001; Henrich 2009).
2. Cultural adaptation is much more rapid than genetic
adaptation. Adaptive cultural processes are strong
relative to migration and other mixing processes, and
thus, the cultural system can sustain large, persistent
differences in behavioral patterns between neighboring
social groups. By contrast, because natural selection on
genes is typically weak relative to migration among
neighboring groups of mammals, it does not typically
maintain substantial genetically transmitted differences
among such groups.
3. As hypothesized by Darwin, competition between
groups favors the spread of culturally transmitted
behaviors that enhance the competitive ability of
groups.
We have developed a number of theoretical models that
demonstrate the cogency of this argument, presented
empirical data that suggests that the assumptions of the
models are realistic, and reviewed empirical examples of
cultural changes that result from competition between
groups. Summaries and further references can be found in
Richerson and Boyd (2005), Boyd and Richerson (2009),
Henrich (2004, 2008), and Henrich and Henrich (2007).
In four recent papers, Lehmann and a series of
collaborators have challenged the logical foundations of
our hypothesis about the evolution of large-scale coopera-
tion in humans. In two papers, Lehmann et al. (2008a, b)
present models showing that a particular form of cultural
transmission can actually reduce the range of parameters
that allow the evolution of altruistic traits. Based on these
results, they argue that we have been premature in
concluding that culture facilitates the evolution of cooper-
ation. Two other papers argue against specific components
of our hypothesis: Lehmann and Feldman (2008) analyze
models suggesting that a conformist social learning psy-
chology does not enhance the evolution of altruism.
Lehmann et al. (2007) argue that the punishment of
noncooperators cannot evolve unless the transmitted var-
iants giving rise to punishment and to cooperation are
linked.
In this paper, we show that Lehmann and colleagues
reach different conclusions than we do because they make
different assumptions, both about the processes that
maintain variation among groups and about the selective
processes that lead to the spread of group beneficial
variants. In both studies of Lehmann et al. (2008a, b), they
assume that rates of cultural adaption are so weak that
cultural adaptation does not affect variation among groups.
In Lehmann and Feldman (2008), they assume complete
mixing every generation so that cultural adaptation cannot
maintain persistent variation among groups no matter how
strong it might be. In Lehmann et al. (2007), the
conclusions about the necessity of linkage are based on a
model that does not include different rates of extinction for
groups held at different stable frequencies of cooperation by
variation in the frequency of punishment. These differences
in assumptions change both the nature of the forces that
generate relatedness among interacting individuals and the
way that groups compete. As a result, the nature of the
evolutionary processes shaping social behavior is very
different than in models we have made. Their work
provides a competing explanation for the cultural evolution
of human cooperation. The key questions are thus empirical
not logical: which assumptions better fit with what we
know empirically about human learning, cultural diffusion,
cultural variation, and human cooperation?
Lehmann et al. do not clearly delineate how their models
differ from ours, and in some places, seem to imply that
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assumptions are unimportant. In what follows, we delineate
the differences in assumptions between our work and that
of Lehmann and colleagues and explain why these different
assumptions yield different conclusions. We begin with the
central issues discussed in Lehmann et al. (2008a, b) and
then turn to more specific questions discussed in Lehmann
a n dF e l d m a n( 2008) and Lehmann et al. (2007). We
conclude by presenting data indicating that the Lehmann
et al. (2008a, b) models seem inconsistent with the
observed scale of cultural variation, and thus, do not
provide a plausible alternative explanation for the evolution
of large scale of human cooperation. However, these
models may be relevant to the cultural evolution of
cooperation on smaller demographic scales.
Does culture facilitate the evolution of cooperation?
Lehmann et al. (2008b) suggest that we have argued that all
forms of cultural inheritance make it easier for cooperation
to evolve. They then refute this argument by analyzing
models in which altruism evolves under a narrower range of
conditions with cultural transmission than with vertical,
gene-like transmission. However, we have never argued
that culture always makes it easier for cooperation to
evolve. Given the vast diversity of possible cultural
transmission mechanisms, and the poor state of our
empirical knowledge about such mechanisms, it would be
foolish to claim that any imaginable form of cultural
transmission facilitates the evolution of cooperation. In-
stead, we have made a much more specific argument.
Human cooperation depends on systems of norms main-
tained by punishment, reputation, conformist cultural
transmission, and other learning biases. Because cultural
adaptation can be much more rapid than genetic adaptation,
cultural evolution generates more stable behavioral varia-
tion among large groups, even very large groups. Like most
models of this kind, our work reveals conditions both
favorable and unfavorable to the spread of larger-scale
cooperation via cultural evolution.
The models in Lehmann et al. (2008b) are different from
ours in two important respects. First, they assume that
adaptive forces are very weak, and as a result, their work
closely resembles many recent inclusive fitness models
used in population genetics (e.g., Lehmann and Keller
2006). Second, they assume island model rather than
stepping stone population structure, as in Boyd and
Richerson (2002), the model that they use as a comparison.
To see why these alternative assumptions yield different
evolutionary dynamics, let us consider these models in
detail. Lehmann et al. (2008a, b) seek to compare the
evolution of altruism under horizontal and vertical cultural
transmission. The vertical model is similar to genetic
models of the evolution of altruism in viscous populations
(e.g., Taylor 1992) and thus serves as a baseline for
comparison. The population is structured into a large
number of groups. Local population regulation maintains
groups at a fixed, finite size and during each generation
groups exchange migrants with all other groups. There are
two variants, an altruistic variant that produces a benefit to
all group members and a selfish variant that does not.
Benefits and costs affect individual survival so that altruists
have lower survival rates than selfish individuals within
their own group, but groups with more altruists have higher
average fitness and produce more emigrants.
The horizontal cultural evolutionary model is meant to
be a generalization of the model in Boyd and Richerson
(2002). Again the population is structured into a large
number of fixed, finite-sized groups. Lehmann et al.
consider two different payoff structures: In the body of
the paper, they present a model in which there is an
altruistic variant and a selfish variant just as in the vertical
model. This is a crucial modification of Boyd and
Richerson (2002) where the core assumption is that there
is are two norms, both stable when common. Altruistic
variants cannot spread in that model because they are not
favored in any group, and therefore, adaptive processes
cannot maintain variation among groups. However, in the
online supplementary materials of their paper, Lehmann et al.
analyze a second model in which the payoff structure is given
byaStagHuntgame,asinBoydandRicherson(2002). There
are two variants. Each has higher payoff than the other when
it is common, but one type increases the average payoff of
all in the group while the other type does not. Cultural
transmission is payoff biased: individuals meet another
individual, the “model,” and adopt the model’sb e h a v i o r a l
variant with a probability proportional to the difference in
payoffs. With some probability, the model is drawn from
another randomly chosen group; otherwise, the model is
drawn from the individual’s own group. This leads to the
exchange of cultural variants among groups. Models drawn
from groups with higher frequencies of group beneficial
behavior are more likely to be copied.
To analyze these models, Lehmann et al. restrict
parameter values so that the adaptive forces, natural
selection in the vertical model and payoff-biased imitation
in the horizontal model, are much weaker than changes
caused by the flow of cultural variants among groups. As a
result, the relatedness within groups (or, equivalently, the
variation among groups) rapidly comes to a “quasiequili-
brium” determined only by interplay of random sampling
variation and the flow of heritable variants among groups—
adaptive forces (natural selection and payoff-biased trans-
mission) are ignored. This assumption greatly simplifies the
analysis for two reasons: First, because relatedness equili-
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frequencies due to adaptive forces, the equilibrium related-
ness can be taken as a fixed parameter in calculating the
inclusive fitness of each variant. Second, adaptive forces
are slow enough that changes in frequency result from the
average relatedness over all groups—once its effect on
inclusive fitness is taken into account, group structure can
be ignored. Lehmann and colleagues use this approach to
analytically derive the conditions under which an altruistic
variant can increase and show that the conditions are less
restrictive under vertical inheritance than horizontal trans-
mission because emigrants leave the group and therefore,
there is less competition among descendants in the vertical
case.
In contrast, we (Boyd and Richerson 2002, 1990)
assume that adaptive processes in cultural evolution are
strong compared to migration. This assumption is supported
by empirical evidence from many sources. Recent studies
of cultural transmission in humans suggest that learning
mechanisms generate potent effects (see reviews in Henrich
and Gil-White 2001; Henrich and Henrich 2007: chapter 2;
McElreath et al. 2008; Mesoudi 2009), and the literatures
on the diffusion of innovations, public health, business,
history, and anthropology provide much evidence of rapid
cultural change (reviewed in Richerson and Boyd 2005;
Henrich 2001). Often, novel cultural traits, including new
norms and practices, spread to fixation in less than one
generation. Since trait frequencies evolve rapidly, local
conditions are important. We also focus only on payoff
structures typical for interactions involving reputation,
repeated interaction, multi-stage games, and contingent
behavior that readily generate multiple stable equilibria.
This means that adaptive cultural forces like payoff-biased
transmission can lead to substantial differences in variant
frequencies in different groups.
Such systems cannot be analyzed using the weak
selection, quasiequilibrium approach used by Lehmann et
al., and instead, must be represented as high dimension
dynamic systems that include a state variables representing
the frequencies of the variants in each group. It is not easy
to solve such systems analytically, particularly if groups are
finite and therefore the system is stochastic. However,
simulating the behavior of such systems is straightforward.
To illustrate the impact of the different assumptions
about the strength of adaptive forces, we simulated a model
very similar to the horizontal model in Lehmann et al.
(2008b) with weak payoff bias and strong payoff bias. A
population of size N is divided into groups with n
individuals. There are two cultural variants, labeled 0 and
1. Let xi be the frequency of variant 1 in group i. The life
cycle has three steps: First, there is a mutation-like process.
With probability μ, each variant spontaneously transforms
into the alternative variant. In all simulations, μ=10
−4.
Second, individuals interact socially. The payoffs in group i
are:
w0 ¼ 1 þ gxi ð1Þ
w1 ¼ 1 þ sx i  ~ x ðÞ þ gxi ð2Þ
Thus, variant 1 produces a benefit to every member of the
group proportional to g and has higher payoff than variant 0
if xi > ~ x where s>0 and 0 < ~ x < 1. Thus, both variant 0
and variant 1 are favored when common. The parameter s
controls the magnitude of this effect. Third, after social
interaction, individuals meet a model and observe its
payoff. With probability m the model is drawn from
another, randomly chosen, group, and with probability 1−
m from the individual’s own group. The learner adopts the
model’s variant with probability
1
2 1 þ b wm   wf
     
ð3Þ
Where wm and wf are the payoffs of the model and focal,
respectively, which captures individuals’ tendency to switch
to the model’s behavior if the model has a higher payoff.
The parameter β controls the strength of biased transmis-
sion, with larger values of β creating more rapid adaptive
change. The MatLab code used in the simulations is given
in the supplementary materials and is also available from
the first author on request.
Increasing the strength of biased transmission changes
the nature of the forces that shape relatedness within
groups. To see why, consider the special symmetric case
in which ~ x ¼ 0:5 and g=0. There are 500 groups each with
100 individuals. Initially the frequency of variants 0 and 1
is one half, and groups are either all one type or all the
other type. This means the relatedness within groups
(approximately the fraction of variance among groups for
groups of this size) in the population is initially equal to
one. We adopt these artificial symmetrical initial conditions
for clarity. The qualitative conclusions listed below will
hold as long as the initial conditions lead to a steady state in
which each variant is at high frequency in at least one
group in the strong bias case.
Figure 1(a) shows the results for a weak transmission
bias (s=0.1, β=0.01). Relatedness declines rapidly to
steady state value of around 0.2, about the value predicted
by the weak bias approximation given in Lehmann et al.
(2008b), and as a result, adaptive processes like selection
and payoff-biased transmission can lead to the spread of
low levels of individually costly group beneficial behaviors.
Compare these results to those shown in Fig. 1(b) where
bias is strong (s=0.1, β=0.5). Now, the relatedness within
groups stabilizes at a much higher value, around 0.8. Note
that we are conforming to the contemporary definition of
relatedness as a measure of the extent to which an
434 Behav Ecol Sociobiol (2011) 65:431–444individual’s variant predicts the variants of others in the
group extended to cultural inheritance (Alison 1992). When
selection is strong, this does not, necessarily, measure the
extent to which individuals are similar by common descent.
When groups are large, relatedness is approximately the
proportion of variation between groups.
To see why relatedness within groups is greater in the
strong bias case, consider the distribution of frequencies of
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Fig. 1 a Model behavior when biased cultural transmission is weak and
both variants have a higher payoff when common. The payoffs are
symmetric so that the basins of attraction of both equilibria are the same,
and there is no group benefit. There are 500 groups each with 100
individuals. The probability of choosing a model from outside the group
is0.02.Initially,halfofthegroupsareallonevariantandotherhalfarethe
other variant. i The relatedness within groups converges rapidly to a
value predicted by the analytical treatment given in Lehmann et al.
(2008b). ii The overall frequency does not change due to the symmetry
of the model. iii The distribution of frequencies across groups in the
final time period. The distribution is unimodal, but because relatedness
is approximately equal to 0.2, the variance of this distribution is much
greater than that would be predicted if groups were sampled at random
with probability 0.5. b Model behavior when biased cultural transmis-
sion is strong. Parameter values as in a,e x c e p tt h a tt h es t r e n g t ho f
payoff-biased transmission in increased by a factor of 20 (β=0.5).i The
relatedness within groups converges rapidly to a value that is much
higher than in the weak bias case. Relatedness here is a measure of the
extent to which one individual’s type predicts the types of others in its
group, but is mostly not due to common descent. ii The overall
frequency does not change. iii The distribution of frequencies across
groups in the final time period. This shows why relatedness is so high—
the cultural analog of disruptive selection creates a bimodal distribution
of frequencies across groups. Because most of the groups are either
mostly one variant or mostly the alternative variant, an individual’so w n
variant is a good predictor of the variants of others in its group
Behav Ecol Sociobiol (2011) 65:431–444 435the group beneficial trait across groups in the two cases.
When bias is weak, the distribution of frequencies across
groups is unimodal. The variance across groups exceeds the
level that would result from random group formation, so an
individual’s own type predicts the types of others in its
group. When bias is strong, the cultural analog of
disruptive selection creates a bimodal distribution of
frequencies across groups. Because most of the groups
are composed of mostly one variant or mostly the
alternative variant, an individual’s own variant is a much
better predictor of the variants of others in its group than in
the weak bias case.
As is shown in Fig. 2, the effect of group size on
relatedness is very different in weak bias and strong bias
cases. When payoff-biased transmission is weak (β=0.01),
relatedness gets smaller as group size increases because
relatedness derives from common descent and the proba-
bility that two individuals have the same cultural parent
declines as groups get bigger. In contrast, when the payoff-
biased transmission is strong (β=0.5), variation among
groups and (therefore, relatedness within groups) is mainly
created and maintained by biased transmission. Because the
strength of bias does not depend on group size, the within
group relatedness remains high even when groups are very
large, and as a consequence, very few individuals are
similar due to shared descent. In fact, in the limit of infinite
groups (as assumed in Boyd and Richerson 2002), the
probability of common descent is zero, but relatedness has
the approximately same value shown in Fig. 2.
Both strong and weak biases can generate group
beneficial behavior but in very different ways. Lehmann
et al. (2008b) derive a condition for the group beneficial
variant to increase when rare. In the notation of the present
model, this condition can be rearranged to become:
s~ x <
Rsþ mg ðÞ
1   R 1   m ðÞ ðÞ
ð4Þ
Where R ¼ 1=ðnmð2   mÞÞ is the equilibrium relatedness if
bias is weak and groups are large. When individuals with
the group beneficial variant are rare, they suffer a payoff
disadvantage relative to the common variant. The magni-
tude of this disadvantage is proportional to s~ x, so the left
hand side is the cost associated with the group beneficial
variant when it is rare. The right hand side is proportional
to the relatedness and gives the inclusive fitness benefit
associated with the group beneficial variant. Because R is
proportional to 1/n, this condition becomes hard to satisfy
when groups are large, and thus, this mechanism cannot
lead to the spread of the group beneficial variant in the
infinite groups assumed in Boyd and Richerson (2002). The
dynamics in the weak bias case are given in Fig. 3.
Relatedness quickly converges to the predicted equilibrium
value, and the group beneficial trait increases because the
inclusive fitness benefits exceed the cost. Relatedness here
is due to common descent.
In contrast, now suppose that payoff bias is strong
enough relative to mixing that once either trait is common
within a group, it will remain common, and that the group
beneficial trait is initially common in a single group. In this
case, nothing happens even though (4) is satisfied. The
group beneficial trait still raises payoffs, and individuals in
the group in which it is common are still disproportionately
imitated by individuals in other groups, and relatedness is
high. However, unlike weak selection models, producing
more emigrants is not enough. The group beneficial trait
does not spread to groups in which it is not common
because payoff bias acts strongly against the trait in such
groups. Thus, the group beneficial trait remains common in
the initial population, but cannot spread.
The group beneficial trait can spread, even in very large
groups, if the model is modified in one of two ways. First
suppose that groups with a higher frequency of the group
beneficial trait are less likely to suffer extinctions, and that
empty habitats are recolonized by individuals drawn from a
single randomly selected group (Boyd and Richerson
1990). This assumption is consistent with ethnographic,
historical, and archeological research (Soltis et al. 1995;
Keeley 1997; Bowles 2009). Figure 4 shows that the group
beneficial trait increases and relatedness remains high even
though the groups are an order of magnitude larger than in
the weak bias case. When n=1,000 and payoff bias is weak,
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Fig. 2 Mean relatedness within groups during the last period of the
simulation as a function of group size. When payoff-biased transmis-
sion is weak (β=0.01), relatedness among group members declines as
group size increases because relatedness derives from common
descent, and the probability that two individuals have the same
cultural parent declines as groups get bigger. In contrast, when the
payoff-biased transmission is strong (β=0.5), variation among groups
(and therefore, relatedness within groups) is mainly created and
maintained by bias and common descent plays a minor role. Since the
strength of bias does not depend on group size, the within group
relatedness does not depend on group size
436 Behav Ecol Sociobiol (2011) 65:431–444R is very low, and the group beneficial trait is unlikely to
spread. Notice that the dynamics of the distribution of
frequencies across groups is very different than in the weak
bias case—throughout the process, strong bias maintains
quite different frequencies of the group beneficial trait
among groups, and adaptation occurs because groups with a
low frequency of the group beneficial variant are more
likely to go extinct than groups with a high frequency of the
variant. Very similar dynamics result if extinctions are
random, but groups with high frequencies of the group
beneficial variant are more likely to grow and colonize
empty patches, or if groups engage in conflicts with other
groups and groups with a higher frequency of the group
beneficial variant are likely to be victorious.
The second way to modify the strong bias model is to
use a stepping stone population structure so that individuals
only imitate models in a small number of neighboring
groups (Boyd and Richerson 2002). Lehmann et al. assume
island model migration, and this is sensible given their
assumption of weak bias—there is only a modest difference
between island and stepping stone models in the weak bias
case because traits diffuse rapidly throughout the popula-
tion. However, when bias is strong, the difference is crucial.
If the group beneficial trait becomes common in one group,
the high payoff causes individuals in neighboring groups to
adopt the group beneficial variant, which can tip the
neighbors into the basin of attraction of the group beneficial
trait. This results in a cascade that spreads the group
beneficial trait throughout the population. This process is
formally similar to genetic models of the third phase of
Wright’s shifting balance process (e.g., Gavrilets 1996), the
dynamics of hybrid zones (Barton 1979), and early models
of reciprocal altruism (Boorman and Levitt 1973, 1980).
The difference is that cultural adaptation can maintain sharp
heritable behavioral differences among neighboring human
social groups—neighboring ethnolinguistic groups number-
ing a few thousand people living a few kilometers apart can
have mutually unintelligible languages and strikingly
different moral systems. Step clines on this scale do not
seem to occur with genetically transmitted influences on
social behavior within other large mobile mammal species
because, we believe, selection is usually not strong enough
relative to migration among local groups.
Conformism can facilitate the evolution of cooperation
In a series of studies, we (e.g., Boyd and Richerson 1985:
chapter 7; Henrich and Boyd 2001) have argued that a
“conformist” bias in social learning may facilitate the
evolution of altruism. Conformist bias occurs when
individuals are disproportionately likely to acquire the
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Fig. 3 The dynamics of the
group beneficial trait when pay-
off bias is weak (n=100, m=
0.02, s=0.2, g=1,~ x ¼ 0:25, b=
0.05). There are 500 groups.
Initially, there is one group in
which the frequency of the
group beneficial variant is one
in one group and zero in all
other groups. a Relatedness
quickly attains the predicted
equilibrium value (≈0.2 for these
parameter values) and b shows
that because the inclusive fitness
benefits exceed the costs, the
group beneficial trait increases
in frequency. c Distribution of
frequencies across groups as the
group beneficial trait increases.
Individuals with the group ben-
eficial variant rapidly diffuse
throughout the population, and
then the distribution of frequen-
cies results from the interplay of
migration and common descent.
Adaptation can be understood as
responding to the average over
the entire distribution
Behav Ecol Sociobiol (2011) 65:431–444 437more common variant from among the variants that they
observe. So, for example, if three of four models have one
variant and the fourth model has a second variant, the
probability of acquiring the common variant is greater than
three quarters. Such a bias creates an evolutionary force that
increases the frequency of the more common variant in the
population. Theoretical work predicts that natural selection
will favor conformist-biased social learning in some kinds
of spatially and temporally varying environments (Henrich
and Boyd 1998; Nakahashi 2007; Wakano and Aoki 2007;
Kendal et al. 2009) and when social learning has a high
error rate (Henrich and Boyd 2002). In both cases, more
than one cultural variant will coexist, but the most adaptive
variant will tend to be more common. Thus, all other things
being equal, a predisposition to adopt the more common
variant increases the chance of acquiring the most adaptive
variant. Recent experimental work indicates that human
social learning is subject to conformist bias (Efferson et al.
2008; McElreath et al. 2008).
Conformist bias can facilitate the evolution of altruism in
large groups because it creates multiple stable equilibria,
which in turn can create and sustain variation among
groups. To see how this works, consider what happens
when a potentially altruistic trait evolves under the
influence of payoff-biased transmission alone. Altruists
produce a benefit to the group at a cost to themselves. This
means that payoff bias decreases the frequency of altruists
in every group unless groups are small enough or migration
rates are low enough that there is enough relatedness within
groups to create a compensating inclusive fitness benefit (or
equivalently, maintain sufficient variation among groups so
that there is sufficient between group selection in favor of
altruists). Now, suppose that in addition to payoff bias,
there is also a conformist bias. Remember that conformist
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Fig. 4 The dynamics of the group beneficial trait when bias is strong
and the group beneficial trait lowers extinction rates (n=1,000, m=
0.02, s=0.2, g=0, ~ x ¼ 0:5, β=1.0). There are 50 groups. The
probability of extinction in group i each time period is ε(1−xi) where
xi is the frequency of the group beneficial trait in group i and ε=0.015,
a value that when combined with the distribution of frequencies yields
extinction rates roughly consistent with those observed in tribal
societies (Soltis et al. 1995) assuming simulation time periods of
1 year. Empty habitats are recolonized by immigrants from a single
surviving group. Initially, there is one group in which the frequency of
the group beneficial variant is one and zero in all other groups. a
Relatedness quickly reaches an equilibrium value of about 0.8 even
though groups are quite large because strong bias maintains the group
beneficial norm at either a high or low frequency in every group.
Here, relatedness is mainly not the result of common descent. b The
group beneficial trait spreads because groups with a high frequency of
the group beneficial trait are much less likely to become extinct. c
Distribution of frequencies across groups as the group beneficial trait
increases. Throughout the process, strong bias maintains groups at
strongly different frequencies, and adaptation occurs because groups
with a low frequency of the group beneficial variant are more likely to
go extinct than groups with a high frequency of the variant
438 Behav Ecol Sociobiol (2011) 65:431–444bias tends to increase the common type. So if conformist
bias is strong enough, it can maintain altruists at high
frequency in some groups even though they achieve a lower
payoff. Thus, conformist bias creates multiple equilibria in
situations with an altruistic payoff structure, and if the bias
is strong compared to migration in a structured population,
this allows altruism to evolve in very large groups for the
same reasons described above.
This mechanism may be of particular importance for the
maintenance of punishment (Henrich and Boyd 2001).
Because punishment suffers a smaller disadvantage when
cooperation is common, even weak conformism (combined
with payoff-biased transmission) can stabilize punishment
against the invasion of second-order free riders who
cooperate but do not punish. This in turn can stabilize
cooperation, and thus, create the conditions that allow
selection among groups to spread punishment and cooper-
ation in much larger groups than is possible without
conformism (Guzmán et al. 2007). Interestingly, these
authors also show that conformism is favored in this model
without any other form of variation in payoffs.
Lehmann and Feldman (2008) study the effect of
conformism on the evolution of altruism. They analyze a
model in which individuals interact in finite groups that are
formed each generation by random sampling from the
population. Once in groups, individuals then undergo an
episode of horizontal conformist cultural transmission that
can amplify initial differences in frequencies among groups
caused by sampling. Lehmann and Feldman show that
when this horizontal transmission episode is subject to a
conformist bias, it is harder for rare altruistic cultural
variants to increase. They conclude, “Our results illustrate
that a frequency-dependent assimilation rule such as biased
conformist transmission…is unlikely to promote the evolu-
tion of altruistic helping in situations where it is otherwise
difficult to explain, that is, in populations of large size when
the trait is initially rare. (p. 514)”
Lehman and Feldman reach different conclusions than
we do about the effect of conformist bias because they have
made different assumptions about the effects of adaptation
and mixing. In their model, conformist-biased cultural
transmission cannot maintain persistent variation among
groups because there is complete mixing every generation.
Suppose that the altruistic variant is rare in the population.
If chance assortment leads to a group with a high frequency
of the altruistic variant, it will have higher average fitness.
However, offspring produced by the group are randomly
mixed with offspring from other groups. As a result, the
altruistic variant will remain rare, and conformist bias will
act to decrease its frequency. However, if biased transmis-
sion is strong compared to mixing, this group will persist in
maintaining the altruistic variant at high frequency, and
altruism can spread through the population as a whole
either due to the differential extinction or stepping stone
processes discussed above. Thus, the altruistic variant can
spread when it is rare in the population as a whole as long
as some random nonadaptive process causes it to become
common in a single local group. The same is true for the
case of alternative norms discussed above.
There are at least three plausible processes that can do
this. First, sampling variation leads to cultural drift, a
process closely analogous to genetic drift (Cavalli-Sforza
and Feldman 1981; Neiman 1995; Shennan 2001). Such
cultural drift can lead to “peak shifts” for the same reasons
as genetic drift. Moreover, if as some authors have argued
(Claidiere and Sperber 2007; Griffiths et al. 2008; Henrich
2009), the cultural analog of mutation rates are much higher
than genetic mutation rates, the equilibrium frequency of
deleterious traits resulting from the balance of adaptive bias
and cultural mutation will be higher, and therefore, waiting
times for peak shifts should be much shorter. Note that this
mechanism depends on sampling variation and should be
less effective in large groups. It will also be less effective
when adaptive forces are strong.
There are, however, two mechanisms in which waiting
times for peak shifts are not necessarily reduced in large
populations or when adaptive forces are strong. In random
environments, linkage leading to “genetic draft” (Gillespie
2000, 2001) can also lead to peak shifts, and the rate at
which this occurs does not depend strongly on group size
and may actually increase with the strength of selection.
Linkage in cultural transmission means that you acquire
two traits from the same person, either because that person
is a particularly salient model or because acquiring one trait
increases receptivity to a second trait. This leads to
correlations between traits analogous to linkage disequilib-
rium. Then payoff biases that increase the frequency of one
trait also tend to increase the frequency of correlated traits,
and in a fluctuating environment, this leads to random,
nonadaptive temporal variation in frequencies that can
cause the shift from one basin of attraction to another. For
example, suppose weather patterns shifted in lakeside
village and that fishermen, who previously formed a small
cooperative of low status men who could not become
hunters or warriors, suddenly became the primary providers
of protein, and locally prestigious for their, now-valued,
fishing skills. Selected as potent cultural models for their
fishing skills, these men might also transmit their cooper-
ativeness broadly across the village, tipping the community
into a cooperative basin of attraction.
Finally, both individual learning and biased transmission
depend on environmental cues. One cue will cause an
individual to preferentially adopt one variant, while a
different cue will cause her to adopt the alternative variant.
The cues observed by members of a group may often be
highly correlated. For example, the disastrous loss of WWII
Behav Ecol Sociobiol (2011) 65:431–444 439seems to have shifted the Japanese from a militaristic moral
system to a more pacifistic one (Dower 2000). However,
such cues often have a strong random component, and as a
result, will lead to random fluctuations in the frequency of
different behaviors. For example, the Battles of the Coral
Sea and Midway might easily have gone differently, and if
they had and the US sued for peace, the Japanese might
have “learned” that militarism pays. This process does not
depend on group size and will lead to more rapid shifts
when learning processes are strong.
Punishment can evolve even when not linked
to cooperation
In Boyd et al. (2003), we presented a simulation model
showing how competition among groups could enhance the
evolution of costly punishment when adaptive forces are
strong. The model assumed that there is a population
structured into groups of size n. Each generation individ-
uals can contribute to a collective good at a cost c. Then
individuals can punish any other individual reducing their
fitness an amount p at a cost k. Next, with probability ε,
each group enters into a conflict with another randomly
chosen group. It wins the conflict with a probability
proportional to the difference in the frequency of cooper-
ators between the two groups. Losing groups go extinct and
are replaced by a clone of the winning group. Traits
“mutate” with probability μ. Then, individuals choose
another randomly chosen individual and acquire their trait
from a model with a probability proportional to the
difference in payoffs according to the rule given in (3)
above. Finally, a fraction m of models are drawn at random
from the population as a whole and 1−m from the
individual’s own group. Boyd et al. considered competition
between three strategies, cooperators who contribute to the
collective good but do not punish, punishers who contribute
and punish noncontributors, and defectors who neither
contribute nor punish. The simulations in that paper
indicate that plausible amounts of intergroup conflict can
maintain cooperation and punishment at high levels as long
as payoff biases are strong compared to migration.
Lehmann et al. (2007) analyze a model of the evolution
of cooperation and punishment that is similar to that in
Boyd et al. (2003). The main differences are that in
Lehmann et al. (2007) greater collective action in a group
did not reduce its chances of extinction, and instead, it
increased its average fitness, and the two traits were
transmitted genetically, not culturally. They conclude that
selection can only lead to the evolution of punishment
when the locus that controls punishment is tightly linked to
the locus that controls cooperation. While acknowledging
that their model is not directly comparable to Boyd et al.’s,
they note that punishment and cooperation are linked in that
model, and conjecture that selection would not lead to the
evolution of punishment if this were not the case.
This conjecture is incorrect. We have modified the
simulation used in Boyd et al (2003) so that individuals
acquire the variant of the cooperation trait (contribute or
defect) and the variant of the punishment trait (punish or do
not punish) from two different, randomly chosen models.
(This simulation was written in Visual Basic 5, and the
necessary form and module files are available from the first
author). This corresponds to a recombination rate equal to
one, and means that in each time period immediately after
transmission, the correlation due to linkage between the
cooperation trait and the punishment trait within groups is
very low. It is not exactly zero because the flow of variants
among groups with different frequencies of each trait
generates a low level of correlation.
When transmission biases are weak, Lehmann et al. are
correct—punishment does not evolve. However, when
biases are strong compared to migration between groups,
punishment does evolve, and the results are qualitatively
similar to the original results which assumed that punish-
ment and cooperation were linked. To see why, consider the
results shown in Fig. 5. Both simulations assume that
groups consist of 128 individuals and that migration rate is
1%, and both assume that initially one group has high
frequencies of punishment and cooperation and the rest
have no punishment and no cooperation. The figure shows
the distribution of frequencies across groups after 1,000
time periods. In (a) bias is weak (β=0.05). At steady state,
the frequency of cooperation is about 0.3, the frequency of
punishment is close to zero, and there is no correlation
across groups. This makes sense. Finite group size and
limited migration lead to an equilibrium relatedness of
around 0.3, in this case, due to common descent. Thus, the
lower extinction rates that are generated by cooperation
lead to an inclusive fitness benefit to cooperators. Punish-
ment does not substantially increase the frequency of
cooperation within groups because the transmission bias is
weak, so punishment cannot create an inclusive fitness
benefit, and does not increase in frequency.
In contrast, in (b), the bias is strong (β=0.5). Now at
steady state, the population average frequencies of punish-
ment and cooperation are about 0.4 and 0.9, respectively,
and there is a substantial positive correlation between
cooperation and punishment across groups—groups with
more punishers have more cooperators—even though there
is no correlation within groups. In groups in which
punishers are common, defectors are heavily punished,
have a lower payoff than cooperators who are not punished,
and thus, are less likely to be imitated than cooperators.
This decreases the within group frequency of defectors in
groups in which punishers are common, and as a result, the
440 Behav Ecol Sociobiol (2011) 65:431–444frequency of cooperation in such groups is higher than in
groups in which punishers are rare. Groups with a low
frequency of cooperators go extinct at a higher rate than
those with a high frequency of cooperators, and because
there is a positive correlation across groups, this means that
groups with high frequency of punishers have a lower
extinction rate than groups with a low frequency of
punishers. Of course, punishers always have lower payoffs
than nonpunishers in their group, and thus, the frequency of
punishment within groups tends to decrease. However, in
groups in which defectors are rare, there is little cost to
being a punisher, and thus, frequency of punishment
declines slowly. As long as the increase in frequency due
to differential extinction is greater than the decrease within
groups, punishment and cooperation are sustained at high
frequencies.
Evidence that cultural evolution is subject to strong
adaptive forces
Our models and those of Lehmann et al. (2008b) are based
on different assumptions about the processes that maintain
cultural variation among groups, and the processes that
select among groups. Their work does not refute ours.
Rather, it explores an alternative hypothesis about the
processes that govern the cultural evolution of large-scale
cooperation in human populations in which variation
among groups is maintained by common descent, not
adaptation to local social conditions. Since both accounts
are cogent, we must turn to what is known about human
learning, cultural variation, and cooperation.
One of the striking puzzles about human sociality is that
people frequently cooperate in large groups. This is
obviously true in the agricultural societies of the last
10,000 years in which thousands of individuals are
mobilized for military activity and the construction of large
capital facilities like roads, fortifications, and ceremonial
centers. However, it is also true for small-scale human
societies. For example, hunter–gatherers recruit war parties
numbering in the hundreds of individuals. (See Richerson
and Boyd 2005 and Henrich and Henrich 2007 for
references). Thus, a successful account of human cooper-
ation must explain how substantial cultural variation among
large groups (or equivalently substantial cultural relatedness
within groups) arises and is maintained.
In the Lehmann et al. models, variation among groups
arises from common descent as in genetic models, thus
naively, one might expect that there would be low cultural
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 Fig. 5 The distribution of group frequencies of cooperation and
punishment when bias is weak and when it is strong. Each dot
represents the frequencies of punishment and cooperation in one of
128 groups during the last period (1,000) of the simulation. In both
simulations, c=0.2, p=k=0.8, m=0.01, and n=128. There is complete
recombination each time period. Individuals acquire their punishment
variant and their cooperation variant from different randomly selected
models so that no linkage exists. a Weak forces (β=0.05, ε=0.0015,
μ=0.0001). Relatedness (based on common descent) builds up to
substantial levels, and since extinction rates are proportional to the
frequency of cooperators in groups, selection increases the frequency
of cooperation to a modest level (averaging about 0.3) at steady state.
However, punishment and cooperation are uncorrelated both within
and across groups, so punishment is selected against. It is maintained
in the population by the cultural analog of mutation. b Strong forces
(β=0.5, ε=0.015, μ=0.001). As in the weak bias case, relatedness
builds up due to finite populations and limited migration. However, in
groups with a high frequency of punishers, defectors are selected
against thus maintaining a high frequency of cooperators. Complete
recombination means that there is no correlation between cooperation
and punishment within groups, but there is a strong correlation across
groups generated by the fact that punishment lowers the payoff of
defectors. Thus, the extinction of groups with few cooperators
increases the frequency of punishers, and since punishment has low
cost in groups in which cooperators are common, punishment is
maintained at a substantial frequency (about 0.4) and cooperation at a
higher frequency (about 0.9) than in the weak forces case
Behav Ecol Sociobiol (2011) 65:431–444 441relatedness in large groups. However, as Lehmann and
colleagues (2008a, b, Lehman and Feldman 2008) point
out, the disproportionately important role that prestigious
individuals often play in cultural evolution (Henrich and
Gil-White 2001) could lead to substantial cultural variation
among larger groups and to a high degree of cultural
relatedness. They illustrate this idea with the “teacher”
model (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981). With probability
t, each individual in the group acquires his or her cultural
variant from a single focal individual, the teacher, and, with
probability 1−t, imitates a randomly chosen individual.
This means that when groups are very large, the cultural
relatedness within groups converges to t
2, a result they
believe provides an explanation for observed cultural
variation among large groups. Thus, the idea is that the
cultural analog of reproductive skew reduces the effective
population size and that as a result, common descent
generates substantial variation among large groups.
This account is hard to reconcile with the observed scale
of human cultural variation. In the modern world, there is
substantial variation in beliefs and norms among ethnic
groups and nation states that number millions of individ-
uals. For example, Bell et al. (2009) show that a lower
bound on cultural FST is more than ten times the genetic
FST for neighboring nation states (FST is the fraction of total
heritable variation that is among groups. For large groups, it
is approximately equal to the relatedness within groups).
They also show that lower bounds on the cultural FST
values for four large East African ethnolinguistic units are
quite high, even when ecological variation is controlled for.
It is not plausible that four million Kamba (one of the East
African groups) share a language and many beliefs because
a substantial fraction of them acquired their beliefs by
imitating a small number of people. Consistent with our
model, the traits being measured by Bell et al. are norms
that are plausibly subject to the analog of disruptive
selection; other kinds of traits might have lower FST values.
Nor is this account plausible for smaller scale societies
because the scale of cultural variation in such societies is
typically much larger than the scale of everyday interaction.
For example, among Australian aboriginal foragers, ethno-
linguistic units that shared a common language and culture
typically numbered between 500 and 5,000 (Keen 2004),
and migration rates between ethnic groups were probably
substantial. If we assume that bands numbered between 10
and 100 people, and that everybody in a band imitates a
single individual, then the formula used by Lehman and
colleagues predict that only a small fraction of cultural
variation will be between ethnolinguistic units.
Moreover, empirical evidence indicates that while some
individuals are more important in cultural transmission than
others, probabilities of common descent are too small to
lead to substantial relatedness in very large groups.
Assuming discrete traits, and accurate social learning, the
probability that two individuals acquire the same variant by
common descent is
P
a2
i where ai is the probability that the
ith individual in the group is imitated by a learner in the
next generation. In the limit of very large groups,
P
a2
i is
the relatedness among group members, a generalization of
the teacher model. Henrich and Broesch (2010) have
estimated these ai values in a small Fijian village with 210
residents. In 2003, a sample of 146 subjects were asked to
indicate which other individuals they would go to if they
were seeking information in three different domains:
knowledge about (1) fishing, (2) yam horticulture, and (3)
medicinal plants. Assuming that this is a measure of the
importance of individuals in cultural transmission, these data
can be used to estimate
P
a2
i . The values are 0.043 for
fishing, 0.053 for yam horticulture, and 0.053 for medicinal
plants. Five years later, the protocol was repeated, this time
obtaining 0.040 for fishing, 0.043 for yam horticulture, and
0.034 for medicinal plants. These data indicate that some
individuals have more influence than others, but the
probability that two individuals acquire their beliefs by
common descent is still fairly small. For comparison, the
average genetic relatedness computed from a complete three
generation genealogy taken in 2003 from this group is 0.018.
Nor can the teacher model explain the persistence of
differences between large neighboring groups over
hundreds of generations unless it is assumed that migration
rates are unrealistically low. For example, the Romance/
Germanic linguistic boundary is roughly where the Roman
advance came to rest two millennia ago despite massive
flows of people across the boundary. This boundary also
separates peoples with different norms that lead to
measurably different behavior in important economic
contexts (Brügger et al. 2009). Lehmann et al.’s account
would seem to require that Germans keep speaking German
and keep adhering to German social norms and the French
do the same because there is a significant probability that
they acquire their linguistic and social norms from a small
number of people. We believe that it is more plausible that
strong biased transmission maintains cultural boundaries
(McElreath et al. 2003; Boyd and Richerson 1987). When
people move from one culture to another, they, and
especially their children, modify their language and social
behavior in response to local linguistic and social norms, so
that they will be understood, and approved of. If this
process is sufficiently rapid compared to the rate of
migration, the boundary will be maintained.
Conclusion
Our models and those of Lehmann and colleagues lead to
very different pictures of the cultural evolution of human
442 Behav Ecol Sociobiol (2011) 65:431–444cooperation. In the Lehmann et al. (2008b) world, groups
have different norms and different beliefs and values
affecting cooperation. These differences arise and are
maintained by chance events determining which individuals
happen to be imitated each generation. The incremental
effects of alternative culturally transmitted ideas and
practices on welfare or fitness are small, and, as a result,
ideas and practices move easily from one group to another.
Variation among groups is necessary for the evolution of
norms that are group beneficial but costly when rare.
However, if their effect averaged over all groups is positive,
norms evolve throughout the population at approximately
the same rate. In our picture, groups have different norms
that affect cooperation. Individuals who adhere to the
norms that are common in their group achieve higher
payoffs than individuals who espouse different norms, and
as a result, beliefs and values that make a person likely to
be imitated in one group may have the opposite effect in
other groups. This, in turn, means that beliefs and values do
not move easily from group to group, and this acts to
maintain variation among groups, even very large groups.
Group beneficial ideas spread because groups in which
those ideas are common replace groups in which they are
not, or because they have a big enough effect on
neighboring groups that these groups shift to the norms of
their successful neighbors.
Whether either of these models captures the processes
that have led to the evolution of human cooperation is an
empirical question, both models are cogent; the question is:
does either fit the data? For cultural variation on the scale
of ethnolinguistic groups numbering thousands of individ-
uals, we think that the answer is that our model fits better
than that of Lehmann et al. for the reasons discussed above.
However, it is possible that the Lehmann et al. models will
be useful for understanding the cultural evolution of
cooperation on smaller scales or during earlier periods of
human evolution prior to the emergence of self-enforcing
norms and our current sophisticated forms of cultural
learning. Variation among bands or villages within an
ethnic group could be due to sampling.
Human cultural evolution is usefully conceptualized as a
population process, and as a result, theoretical tools from
population biology can be very helpful in understanding
cultural evolution. However, it is important to resist the
temptation to think that cultural transmission is just like
genetic transmission. The theory of the genetic evolution of
social behavior is highly developed, replete with subtle,
powerful insights, and well-worked out mathematical tools.
In genetic evolution, selection is often weak enough that
relatedness through common descent is sufficient to predict
patterns of social interaction, providing a powerful tool for
understanding the evolution of social behavior. The
evidence suggests that cultural variation is affected by
strong biased transmission, and limited diffusion. If so,
different tools may be necessary to understand the cultural
evolution of group beneficial norms in large groups.
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